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Abstract
This article presents an empirical study of young partisans’ and non-voters’ processing of 
attack ad messages utilised in the 2010 British general election. Expanding understanding of 
how these messages are processed is important because they can aid electoral and civic 
engagement, which is declining amongst youth. Currently there is limited understanding of 
how youth process these ad messages and how they influence their engagement. We applied 
motivated reasoning to explore this in a national survey in England with 18-22 year old 
British first-time voters; with data from 646 respondents presented in this paper. Overall our 
young partisans and non-voters employed motivated reasoning - (de)selection and critical 
appraisal - in their ad processing; thereby advancing understanding of how youth process 
attack election advertising.  Concerns surrounding the use of attack election advertising 
emerge, suggesting the need for greater appraisal of the relevance of marketing in the 
development of election campaign strategies.   
Summary statement of contribution: Through the biases enacted through party identification, 
we expand understanding of young voters (partisans) and non-voters processing of image and 
issue-attack election advertising messages. We also highlight some parameters upon which 
the use of attack election advertising, as an electoral engagement tool, can be critically 
considered. 
Keywords: advertising processing, attack election advertising, motivated reasoning, 
partisanship, political marketing, youth electoral engagement  
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Introduction    
In this article we present the findings of an empirical study of partisans’ (Labour, 
Conservative and Liberal Democrats) and non-voters’ attitudes towards the image and issue-
attack advertising used in the 2010 British general election. In particular we are interested in 
their processing of these advertising messages. Expanding understanding of this is important 
because the provision of information is deemed to be a major factor in enhancing youth 
electoral and civic engagement (Tonge & Mycock, 2010). However, while negative political 
campaign advertising has been extensively investigated, there remains no consensus on how 
effective or detrimental negative campaigning actually is in aiding the electorate’s message 
reasoning (Lau, et al., 2007); meriting further research.  
Developing a fuller understanding of the effects of negative campaigning can be 
usefully explored from a motivated reasoning perspective, most evident in bias elicited by 
party-identification (partisanship). This identification orientation influences the way in which 
messages are processed. However, the application of party identification to political 
advertising has largely been ignored (Chang, 2003); albeit it is well-established within the 
political-behaviour scholarship. Our paper therefore seeks to redress the paucity of evidence 
on the impact of election image and issue-attack advertising on young British partisans and 
non-voters. We go beyond studies on negative attack advertising that do not differentiate 
between responses of partisans, third-party voters and non-voters. This enables us to more 
fully understand how young adults process attack ads as voters (partisans) and non-voters. In 
addition, this study contributes to understanding of the differential effects of image and issue-
attack advertising.  
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Our study also raises a plethora of research questions surrounding the use of attack 
election advertising, particularly in relation to engaging the youth electorate. Thus we also 
proffer a critical appraisal of the relevance of marketing theory and practice to electoral 
politics. This enables us to consider the theme of this special issue, namely the relevance of 
marketing to the broader disciplinary agenda and practice. Given the nature of our research, 
we narrow this question to consider how one element of marketing, namely advertising, and 
more specifically negative attack advertising, is being employed and justified in the 
development of election campaign strategies for political parties. In so doing, we critically 
examine the translation of academic studies into political marketing practice.  
The contribution of our paper is therefore twofold. Firstly, through the biases enacted 
through party identification, we expand understanding of young voters (partisans) and non-
voters processing of image and issue-attack election advertising messages. Secondly we 
highlight some parameters upon which the use of attack election advertising, as an electoral 
engagement tool, can be critically considered. We begin our account by presenting the 
context within which our study resides, namely the 2010 British general election and youth 
electoral disengagement. 
Context of the study  
Set against the national crisis of economic recession, debt, the risk of cuts and increasing 
unemployment, banking failures and the MP expenses scandal, the national advertising 
campaigns in the 2010 British general election were largely attack-orientated (Dermody & 
Hanmer-Lloyd, 2011). Labour ran a personally attacking campaign aiming to undermine 
Conservative leader David Cameron; which focused on creating fear of the consequences of 
electing a Tory government. The majority of the Conservatives advertising concentrated on 
maligning Gordon Brown to emotionally remind Britons that Brown was personally 
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responsible for ‘breaking’ their country and hence could not be trusted. The Liberal 
Democrats (LibDems) Labservative guerrilla viral advertising campaign attacked both 
Labour and the Conservatives for their years of electoral broken promises.  
With respect to youth engagement with electoral politics, concern is growing amongst 
Western societies surrounding increasing youth political disengagement. Numerous studies 
indicate that this is most evident through their non-voting and limited political activism and 
volunteering. For example, reviewing the voting statistics from the previous three British 
general elections, it is evident that the majority of 18-24 year olds consistently do not vote;(1)
and the proportion of young voters is declining.(2) Further, in contrast to older age-groups, 
British young people are more highly distrustful of politicians, sceptical about political 
institutions and broadly negative towards anything they consider to be (party) political (see 
for example Dermody, et al., 2010; Fieldhouse, et al., 2007; Hay, 2007; Hay & Stoker, 2008; 
Henn & Foard, 2012; Russell & Stoker, 2008; Tonge & Mycock, 2010). As a result they are 
less convinced by the utility of voting. Accordingly the problem of youth political 
disengagement relates to both their perceptions, attitudes and their behaviour. Compounding 
this, research also suggests a potential generational effect where young people consistently 
opt out of electoral participation (see for example Electoral Commission and the Hansard 
Society, 2006; Hansard Society, 2013; Russell Commission, 2005; Youth Citizenship 
Commission, 2009). Furthermore, according to Hannon and Tims (2010), the unremitting 
societal, political and economic challenges facing this generation of young adults will remain 
unsolved unless they proactively and enthusiastically engage with government to develop 
solutions. Thus, in failing to do so, they continue to facilitate their disempowerment and limit 
opportunities for their future. Consequently youth political disengagement is an acute 
problem. It inhibits effective policy-making, undermines the future legitimacy of 
parliamentary politics, and damages youth civic agency and identity. 
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Why, then, are young people politically disengaged? From our evaluation of the 
evidence on youth political disengagement,(3) the causes are multiple and complex. Research 
suggests primary factors include low trust, high levels of political cynicism and scepticism, 
limited knowledge and comprehension, feelings of isolation and alienation, and their 
perceptions of the irrelevance of parliamentary/presidential politics to their everyday lives 
(see appendix 1). Overall these studies consistently argue that this disconnection from 
electoral politics can lead young people to feel highly politically disenfranchised compared 
with older age groups, creating a cycle of disengagement as their ‘identity’ is undermined as 
politically and socially active members of society. In a paradoxical twist, however, this 
disenfranchisement might have been exacerbated by the political parties disbanding their 
youth divisions in a bid to deactivate their dissenting voice (Kimberlee, 2002).  
Given this evidence, it might be considered surprising to find young British adults 
voting in elections. The question of why has received less research investigation (see 
Dermody, et al., 2010; Fieldhouse, et al., 2007; Pleyers, 2005; Russell, et al., 2002; White, 
2010). These studies suggest that young voters also hold the cynical attitudes and beliefs 
characteristic of non-voters, albeit to a lesser degree. Consequently the broad issues 
surrounding the electoral engagement of young British adults would appear to apply to both 
non-voters and voters. Therefore the consequences of youth political disengagement (and 
their limited engagement) for both democracy and for young people themselves and the 
ongoing challenges this raises for marketing electoral politics to youth deem the British youth 
electorate of significant research interest. Hence they constitute the focus of our research 
investigation. We now move on to present the conceptual foundations of our study.  
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Conceptual development: partisanship, motivated reasoning and negative attack 
advertising  
We have previously presented detailed accounts of attack advertising and partisanship, 
consequently it is not our intention to repeat these reviews here (Dermody et al fc; Dermody 
& Hanmer-Lloyd 2011). Instead we identify salient issues that arise from this scholarship to 
enable readers to understand the conceptual foundations of our research and our research 
hypotheses. Motivated reasoning is integrated into our synthesis to illuminate the processing 
bias embedded within individuals’ advertising message evaluation.   
Partisanship and motivated reasoning  
Partisanship is of value in exploring youth attitudes to attack advertising because it 
establishes that party orientation influences voters’ processing of campaigns (Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1997; Bothwell & Brigham, 1983; Chang, 2003) and, beyond this, is a 
comprehensive powerful force shaping individuals’ perceptions and responses to the political 
world (Bartels, 2002). As Bartels (2002, p. 138) observes “…partisanship is not merely a 
running tally of political assessments, but a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens’ 
perspectives of, and reactions to, the political world”.  
Partisanship can be more fully understood with reference to social identity theory 
(Tajfel, 1978), because it helps to explain the behaviour of partisans. Social identity is 
“…part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership 
of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to 
that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Social identity generates a ‘sense of belonging’ to a 
social group, by highlighting similarities to members of their own social group and 
simultaneously establishing distinctions to others (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Turner, 1999). It is in this respect that social identity is pertinent to the study of 
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partisanship as partisans' identity significantly influences their responses to persuasive 
messages and media campaigns (Duck, et al., 1998; Elder, et al., 2006). Consequently 
partisans might show favouritism towards in-group members (i.e. their own political party) 
and perceive greater differences to out-group members (i.e. from an opposition  party) than 
actually exist (Greene, 2004; Kelly, 1988). This distinction between in-groups and out-groups 
suggests a universal need to maintain a positive evaluation of the self and the social groups 
one belongs to (Mackie & Smith, 1998). As a result, those who strongly identify with an in-
group are more likely to display a stronger bias in favourably evaluating the in-group, its 
members, products, and experiences (Hewstone, et al., 2002; Turner, 1999; Verlegh, 2007). 
Thus the origin of selectivity in partisans’ processing of election attack ads becomes clearer. 
Furthermore, in attacking the source of this identification, in this case a political party, the 
self-esteem of its partisans (those who identify with the party) can be threatened (Einwiller, et 
al., 2006). In such circumstances partisans will adopt coping strategies to try to defend their 
social identities and compensate for the disadvantaged position of the group (Abrams & 
Hogg, 1988; Mummendey, et al., 1999). This signals how social identity is a significant 
antecedent of attitudinal and behavioural commitment (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000). 
Identification is hence the key depiction of an individuals’ relationship with an organisation, 
for example a political party, and the proximal cause of motivated reasoning (Brown, et al., 
2005; Einwiller, et al., 2006).  
The theory of motivated reasoning is a widely accepted psychological account of how 
individuals process political information, thus it underpins understanding of partisanship and 
its effects (Mutz, 2007; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). It originates from the selective-
processing literature and is defined as the unconscious motivation of individuals to arrive at a 
particular conclusion in a rational way and to justify their desired conclusion with supporting 
evidence (Kunda, 1990). It therefore entails a processing bias, whereby individuals seek to 
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maintain their cognitive consistency with their existing attitudes and latent directional goals 
(An, 2002; Frey, 1986; Sweeney & Gruber, 1984). As a result, people who are motivated to 
arrive at a particular conclusion about an issue cannot believe whatever they want to about it 
because there are pressures to maintain “an illusion of objectivity” (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987, p. 302). Motivated reasoning theory is therefore of value in our research 
because it can explicate the potential effects of (party) identity on the perception and 
processing of negative information (Einwiller, et al., 2006). 
 Drawing on the theory of motivated reasoning, it is suggested that partisanship results 
in biased processing of messages via selective information processing; whereby partisans sift 
and analyse information that supports the party they are loyal to, thereby maintaining their 
existing attitudes and thus their cognitive consistency (Chang, 2003; Frey, 1986; Goren, 
2002; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Partisans are not passive 
recipients of information, but are actively involved in information selection and processing, 
including interpretation and counter arguing (Meffert, et al., 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
Consequently partisans have a strong motivational bias in how they collect, appraise and 
integrate information in order to appraise its value (or not), for their existing attitudes towards 
their party and opponents (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Fischle, 2000; Klein & Kunda, 
1992; Kunda, 1990; Stoker, 1993). Therefore, in line with Einwiller et al (2006), motivated 
reasoning, initiated by strong identification, is expected to affect partisans’ attitudes towards 
offending organisations, for example political parties and media and also their evaluation of 
negative information, for example election attack ad messages. There is certainly evidence 
for the biasing nature of party identification in interpreting political advertising (e.g. 
Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Bothwell & Brigham, 1983; Kaid & Tedesco, 1999) and in 
evaluating media coverage of political parties (Vallone, et al., 1985). As Goren (2002, p. 639) 
observes “… partisans are motivated to generate negative evaluations of opposition party 
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candidates and look for cues that enable them to do so in a seemingly rational and objective 
manner”. In reality, however, there is interplay between partisans’ emotional and cognitive 
responses, and both will influence the nature of the biases ensuing from their ad processing 
(Robideaux, 2002). This interplay is explored further in our appraisal of attack advertising. In 
conclusion bias arises when partisans are motivated to seek cues confirming their positive 
evaluations of their party and negative evaluations of opposing parties. With respect to 
partisanship we thus hypothesise: 
H1a: Labour partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad attacking 
the Conservative Leader than the Conservative partisans.  
H1b: Conservative partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad 
attacking the Labour policy issue than the Labour partisans.  
 It has been suggested that partisans and independents experience the same advertising 
stimulus differently (Stevens, et al., 2008), in that strongly identified individuals (i.e. 
partisans) are likely to preserve and protect their positive beliefs when these are challenged 
by negative information (Einwiller, et al., 2006). However, the third party voters in the 
election, the LibDems and the non-voters may not share the attitudes of the two main parties 
in relation to the ads presented, thus the following hypotheses are proposed:  
H2a: Labour partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad attacking 
the Conservative leader than the LibDem partisans.  
H2b: Conservative partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad 
attacking the Labour policy issue than the LibDem partisans.
H3a: Labour partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad attacking 
the Conservative leader than the non-voters.  
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H3b: Conservative partisans have significantly more positive attitudes towards the ad 
attacking the Labour policy issue than the non-voters.
Image versus issue-attack advertising 
It has been purported that negative advertising, particularly issue and image attack ads win 
election contests (Perloff & Kinsey, 1992). Image attacks are highly personalised assaults that 
denigrate the personalities – and hence reputations – of opposing candidates, whilst issue-
attacks assail their policies. Studies indicate the majority of attack advertising is issue-based 
(Kaid, 2012; Scammell & Langer, 2006), albeit there is also an extensive use of image-attack 
ads in British election advertising (Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2005; Dermody & Scullion, 
2001).  
Research indicates that attack advertising has a cognitive impact in terms of 
improving the electorates’ attention-levels, memory (although this is marginal), 
comprehension, evaluation and decision-making, and it is emotionally engaging and risk 
reducing (Brader, 2005; Carraro, et al., 2010; Finkel & Geer, 1998; Geer & Geer, 2003; 
Martin, 2004). In contrast, however, evidence also suggests attack ads are highly damaging to 
electoral involvement because they feed cynicism, facilitate political alienation and discredit 
political argument (see for example Ansolabehere, et al., 1999; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; 
Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Kaid, et al., 2000; Schenck-Hamlin, et al., 2000; Stevens, 2009). 
These ‘contradictions’ partially reflect individuals responding differently to different forms of 
election advertising, which thus requires greater specificity in who and what is being 
researched in political advertising investigations than has historically been the case.  
In addition, the motivated reasoning bias is not always so straightforward. Arcuri et 
al. (2008, p. 372) note, “… if the emotions elicited by the new information are coherent with 
previous evaluations stored in memory and automatically activated, the new information is 
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acquired, accepted and stored. In contrast, new information that contradicts current 
spontaneous evaluation is denied, challenged, or simply ignored.” Consequently, the 
information reasoning of partisans can become more polarised and biased unless negative 
emotions arise in their minds, e.g. anxiety, which then affects their message interpretation 
and electoral decision-making (Arcuri, et al., 2008; Stevens, et al., 2008). This interplay 
between cognitive and affective processing is important in more fully understanding 
processing bias. It has been explored to a limited extent within studies investigating negative 
advertising (see Pinkleton, et al., 2002), but merits further attention. Therefore examining the 
differences between affective and cognitive evaluations can add further insights into the 
attitudes of young partisans (and non-voters) towards image and issue-attack ads. Given the 
nature of attack advertising, attack ads might affect our young partisans and non-voters 
emotions (affective) more than their reasoning (cognitive). Thus we tentatively propose the 
following hypotheses:  
H4a: Affective evaluations of image-attack ads will be significantly more negative than 
cognitive evaluations. 
H4b: Affective evaluations of issue-attack ads will be significantly more negative than 
cognitive evaluations. 
The literature posits that the immunising effect of identification (i.e. tolerating negative 
information about the organisation) will eventually reach its tipping point as the  degree of 
negativity increases  (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Einwiller, et al., 2006). Thus it is not 
surprising that with respect to acceptability, evidence suggests issue-attack ads are judged to 
be more acceptable than more personally malicious image-attack ads (see Brooks, 2006; 
Dermody, et al., 2013; Kates, 1998; Meirick, 2002; Pinkleton, et al., 2002; Robideaux, 1998, 
2002, 2004; Stevens, et al., 2008), possibly because of opportunities to cognitively engage 
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with policy-based messages. We thus propose the following hypothesis in the context of 
young partisans and non-voters.  
H5: All three partisan groups and non-voters will find image-attack less acceptable than 
issue-attack advertising.
There is no consensus in the literature with regards to the influence of attack ads on 
voter turnout. Whilst some authors maintain that attack ads are highly damaging to electoral 
involvement, thereby demobilising turnout (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Kahn & Kenney, 
1999), others argue that there is no evidence that negative advertising suppresses turnout 
(Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Lau, et al., 2007). In addition, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997) 
found that the effects of attack ads differ according to the degree of partisanship. We thus 
finally propose that the influence of the attack ads on voting decision-making will vary for 
partisans and non-voters:  
H6: Partisans will be more influenced by attack ads in their decision to vote than non-voters 
decision not to vote. 
Method  
Procedure and sample  
A quantitative approach was adopted for this research. Our survey was conducted in England 
during the three-week period immediately following the British general election in May 
2010. The target population were 18-22 year old British first-time voters, eligible to vote in 
the 2010 British general election.(4) Similar to most opinion polls, street-intercept interviews 
took place in principal towns in geographic regions throughout England. Data was collected 
in central locations at various times of the day to minimise potential bias (Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). Filter questions were used to ensure that only those 
respondents who fulfilled the sampling criteria were interviewed. Two poster ads, which were 
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attacking in tone, were used as stimuli in the research. Ad1 – ‘Camera on/off’ is an example 
of an image attack, whilst Ad2 – ‘Let’s stop Labour’s job tax’ is an example of a policy issue 
warning (see appendix 2).The questionnaire was fully piloted prior to the start of the survey 
and minor revisions were made. It took the interviewers approximately twenty minutes to ask 
respondents all relevant questions and show stimulus and prompt cards.  
This study is only concerned with those respondents who identified themselves either 
as non-voters or as partisans of the three main political parties, namely Conservative, Labour, 
or LibDem. Of the 733 fully completed questionnaires received, 646 were thus eligible for 
analysis. Our sample therefore comprises of 222 (34.4%) non-voters and 424 (65.6%) voters 
(see appendix 3 for our sample profile). Of the 424 voters in the sample, 26.7% voted for 
Labour, 38.7% for Conservative and 34.7% for LibDem.(5) Thus, there is a fair representation 
of partisans for the three main parties and non-voters in the sample.  
The gender split represents the gender distribution within the UK population for this 
age group (ONS (Office for National Statistics), 2012). While we cannot fully cross-reference 
our 18-22 year olds with the broader population of 18-24 year olds, our sample is biased 
towards students and voters. 43% of young people in Britain are in University education 
(2011 figures). Further, according to Ipsos MORI (2010), voter turnout for 18-24 year olds in 
the 2010 election was 44%. While there are several possible explanations for our higher 
proportions of students and claimed voters, the debriefing with the interviewers revealed the 
difficulty they experienced in securing completed questionnaires among our sample group, in 
sharp contrast to 2005 and 2001. The authors do not believe that this was due to the 
interviewers, but rather to the context within which the election took place, with our 
interviewers reporting a pervasive political malaise once the potential respondents learnt the 
questionnaire was about the election.(6) Consequently, claimed voters (and the majority being 
students) may have had a much stronger predisposition to participate in the survey.  
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Measures
To test the research hypotheses, previously validated and reliable scales were adapted to the 
context of this study on the basis of exploratory research. The ad evaluations were assessed 
with ten bipolar adjective pairs presenting the cognitive and affective domains adapted from 
Robideaux’s studies (Robideaux, 1998, 2002, 2004), Hill (1989) and Tinkham and Weaver-
Lariscy (1994) to our context. The items ‘trustworthy’, ‘helpful’  and ‘persuasive’ were 
added on the basis of exploratory research within the domain of persuasion and credibility. 
The affective items were labelled bad – good, unpleasant – pleasant, irritating – non-
irritating, like – dislike, whilst the cognitive dimension was measured with the following 
items: uninteresting – interesting, uninformative – informative, unbelievable – believable, 
unhelpful – helpful, untrustworthy – trustworthy and not persuasive – persuasive. The items 
were coded on a five-point scale with higher values indicating a more positive attitude, e.g. 1 
(bad) to 5 (good) with a neutral response in the middle. Respondents were also asked to 
indicate on a five-point scale how acceptable they find personality and issue attack 
advertising in general and to what extent attack print advertising influenced their decision to 
vote/not to vote. 
A principal components exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with orthogonal rotation 
(Varimax) was applied to the ten ad evaluation variables to reveal the underlying dimensions 
of attitudes towards the ads in our context. An examination of the results indicates that the 
data is appropriate for EFA. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy 
exceeds, at .88 for Ad1 and .87 for Ad2, the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) 
and Bartlett’s Tests of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) were statistically significant (p£.000) for 
both stimuli ads. In accordance with the Kaiser criterion, only those factors with Eigenvalues 
greater than one were retained for further analysis (Hair, et al., 2007). The solution derived 
from EFA indicates two distinct and interpretable factors for both ads explaining 57.86% of 
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the total variance for Ad1 and 56.29% for Ad2. However, the item ‘helpful’ was cross-
loading on both factors and thus was deleted from further analyses. The two factors 
‘Cognitive Ad Evaluation’ (explaining 31.45% of the variance in Ad1 and 33.97% in Ad2) 
and ‘Affective Ad Evaluation’ (explaining 26.41% in Ad1 and 22.32% in Ad2) confirmed the 
two-factor solution as identified in the literature. The reliability analyses of the identified 
multi-item scales demonstrated good internal consistency for both ad evaluations with 
coefficient alphas exceeding .7 for the majority of the scales (Ad1: aAd1_cogn=.81, 
aAd1_affect=.75, Ad2: aAd2_cogn=.80, aAd2_affect=.70) (see Hair, et al., 2007; Nunnally, 1978). For 
ease of interpretation and to be consistent with previous research (e.g. Mitchell & Olson, 
1981; Robideaux, 2002), construct means were computed for each of the two factors for both 
ads. In addition, an overall attitude mean score was calculated for both ads including all nine 
cognitive and affective measures. The reliability is acceptable with coefficient alpha values 
above .7 (aAd1=.85 and aAd2=.84). The means and standard deviations, as well as the 
coefficient alphas for these factors for both Ad1 and Ad2 are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  
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Table 1: Summary of Factor Scores and Eigenvalues (Varimax Rotation) for Ad1  
AD 1 Image Attack Rotated Factor Loadings Communality Alpha 
Mean 
(SD) 
Variance 
explained & 
Eigenvalue 
Factor 1: Cognitive Ad Evaluation
.81 2.86 (.85) 
31.45% 
(2.83) 
Informative .77 .61 
Believable .74 .63 
Interesting .68 .48 
Trustworthy .66 .62 
Persuasive .70 .55 
Factor 2: Affective Ad Evaluation
.75 2.72 (.86) 
26.41%  
(2.38) 
Good .75 .64 
Pleasant .77 .60 
Non-Irritating .68 .51 
Like .63 .57 
Note: n=646, Items measured on a scale from 1 (e.g. Uninformative) to 5 (e.g. Informative). 
Table 2: Summary of Factor Scores and Eigenvalues (Varimax Rotation) for Ad2  
AD 2 (Issue Attack) Rotated Factor Loadings Communality Alpha 
Mean 
(SD) 
Variance 
explained & 
Eigenvalue 
Factor 1: Cognitive Ad Evaluation
.80 2.90 (.86) 
33.97% 
(3.06) 
Informative .69 .51 
Believable .83 .69 
Interesting .60 .43 
Trustworthy .81 .70 
Persuasive .64 .51 
Factor 2: Affective Ad Evaluation
.70 2.98 (.79) 
22.32% 
(2.01) 
Good .75 .60 
Pleasant .51 .44 
Non-Irritating .77 .60 
Like .60 .59 
Note: n=646, Items measured on a scale from 1 (e.g. Uninformative) to 5 (e.g. Informative). 
Results  
H1a was confirmed as, in contrast to the Conservative partisans, Labour partisans are 
significantly more positive towards Ad1 (Camera on/off image-attack ad against 
Conservatives) than the partisans of the party under attack (Conservative), as indicated by 
their higher mean attitude score (MLabour=3.2, MConservatives=2.7; F(3,642)=14.83, p<.0001). 
Similarly, H1b was supported as the Conservative partisans have a significantly more 
positive attitude towards Ad2 (Job tax issue-attack ad against Labour) than the Labour 
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partisans (Conservatives: MConservatives=3.29; MLabour: M=2.61, F(3,642)=27.42, p<.0001). 
This is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Attitudes towards Image and Issue-Attack Ads 
Note: A lower mean indicates more negativity. A higher mean indicates a more positive ad attitude.
Regarding the third party voters, results showed that LibDem partisans have 
significantly more negative attitudes towards Ad1, than the Labour partisans, thus confirming 
H2a (MLibDems=2.75, MLabour=3.2; p<.0001). A similar picture emerged for H2b which is also 
supported, as LibDem partisans have a significantly lower mean score and thus a more 
negative attitude towards Ad2 than the Conservative partisans (MLibDems=2.82, 
MConservatives=3.29, p<.0001). Comparable results emerged for non-voters who also have 
significantly more negative attitudes towards Ad1 and Ad2 than Labour and Conservative 
partisans, thus supporting H3a and H3b (Ad1: MNon_voter=2.67; Ad2: MNon_voter=M=2.77, 
p<.0001).  
Figure 1 also indicates that the LibDem partisans’ and non-voters’ attitudes towards 
both ads are similar to those of the party under attack, i.e. Conservative partisans in Ad1 and 
Labour partisans in Ad2. The results of the Bonferroni post hoc test confirms that there are no 
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significant differences in the ad evaluation mean scores between LibDem partisans, non-
voters and the party under attack (p>.05).  
Table 3: MANOVA Analysis Summary 
Dependent variable Partisan N Mean SD F df Sig. 
Ad1 Image Attack  Labour 113 3.33 .93 
16.899 3,642 .000 Cognitive  
Factor 
Conservative 164 2.78 .76 
LibDem 147 2.84 .83 
Non-Voter 222 2.68 .79 
Affective 
Factor  
Labour 113 3.07 .88 
8.079 3,642 .000 Conservative 164 2.61 .86 LibDem 147 2.66 .87 
Non-Voter 222 2.65 .80 
Ad2 Issue Attack Labour 113 2.62 .82 
19.442 3,642 .000 Cognitive  
Factor 
Conservative 164 3.31 .82 
LibDem 147 2.84 .84 
Non-Voter 222 2.77 .83 
Affective 
Factor  
Labour 113 2.61 .72 
23.234 3,642 .000 Conservative 164 3.28 .81 LibDem 147 2.80 .79 
 Non-Voter 222 2.76 .68 
Note: A higher mean indicates a more positive attitude towards that particular ad. 
As suggested above, solely examining overall attitude scores might conceal 
significant differences between cognitive and affective ad evaluations. In order to explore 
these in more detail, a one-way between-groups multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was employed. MANOVA has the ability to examine more than one dependent 
variable simultaneously (Hair, et al., 2007). The cognitive and affective ad evaluation 
measures for both ads were the dependent variables, whilst the three main party voters and 
non-voters were the independent variables (four between-group categories). All assumptions 
of normality, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, univariate/multivariate 
outliers and multi-collinearity were tested and no serious violations noted. The homogeneity 
assumption is satisfied as indicated by the Box’s test results (Ad1: M=10.65, F=1.18, p=.31; 
Ad2: M=15.01, F=1.66, p=.09) (Hair, et al., 2007). The results indicated that the interaction 
between the three partisan groups and non-voters regarding the attitudes towards the two 
types of Ads is significant (Ad1: F(6,1284)=8.926, p<.0001, Wilks’ Lambda=.921, Ad2: 
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F(6,1282)=13.452, p<.0001, Wilks’ Lambda=.885). When the results for the independent 
variables were examined individually, a statistical significance was found for all dependent 
variables (see Table 3 and Figure 2), mirroring the results discussed above.  
Figure 2: Cognitive and Affective Attitudes towards Image and Issue Attack Ads 
Ad 1 (Image-Attack)                      Ad 2 (Issue-Attack) 
Note: A lower mean indicates more negativity. A higher mean indicates a more positive ad attitude.  
H4a/b tested whether affective evaluations are significantly more negative than 
cognitive evaluations. A series of paired samples t-tests were employed (see Table 4) and the 
results confirm significant differences between affective and cognitive ad evaluations for 
each partisan group for Ad1 (p<.001). This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that 
affective ad evaluations for Ad1 (image-attack) were significantly more negative than 
cognitive ad evaluations, as indicated by their lower mean scores for each partisan group. 
However, for non-voters no significant difference was found (MAffectiveAd1=2.65, 
MCognitiveAd1=2.68, t=.43, p<.667). Thus H4a is partially confirmed. For Ad2 (issue-attack) no 
significant differences between the mean scores for cognitive and affective ad evaluations 
were established. Consequently H4b is not supported.  
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Table 4: Paired-Samples T-Test Results 
Dependent variable Partisan t df Sig. 
Ad1 Image Attack  Labour 3.49 112 .001* 
Conservative 2.75 163 .007* 
LibDem 3.07 146 .003* 
Non-Voter .43 221 .667 
Ad2 Issue Attack Labour .17 112 .863 
Conservative .42 163 .678 
LibDem .64 146 .526 
Non-Voter .24 221 .811 
Note: * denotes significant at p<.05.
In addition, respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they found image and 
issue attacks acceptable. The results show that only 38.4% found image attack ads acceptable, 
whilst nearly 69.7% of the respondents found issue attack ads acceptable. H5 examines in 
more detail the differences between attitudes towards image attack and issue attack 
advertising. A paired-samples t-test, including all respondents as one group, indicates that 
image attack ads are less acceptable than issue attack ads (t=-16.005, df=612, p<.001, 
MImage=2.83, MIssue=3.66). Thus H5 is supported. Further investigations revealed that 
Conservative partisans found image-attack ads significantly less acceptable than non-voters 
(ANOVA, F(3,617)=3.79, p<.01, MConservative=2.55, MNon-Voter= 2.96). However, there were no 
significant differences between the three partisan groups and non-voters with regards to the 
issue attack ads (F (3,626) =.63, p<.59). The results are illustrated in Figure 3. 
The results shown in Figure 4 indicate a significant difference between two partisan 
groups and non-voters in their decision to vote. For Conservatives and LibDems – the parties 
who were not in power at the time – attack ads had a significantly higher influence on their 
decision to vote (M=2.58 and M=2.45, respectively) than for Labour partisans (M=2.06) and 
non-voters (M=1.80) (F (3,596)=14.23, p<.0001). No significant differences between Labour 
partisans and non-voters were found with regards to the influence on their decision to 
vote/not vote. Thus H6 is partially supported.  
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Figure 3: Acceptability of image & issue         Figure 4: Influence of attack ads  
                 attack ads                             on decision to vote/not vote  
Note: A lower mean indicates less acceptability.               Note:  A lower mean indicates lower influence. A 
         A higher mean indicates more acceptability.                           higher mean indicates higher influence.  
Discussion 
Having presented the findings, we now turn to the discussion. We begin by considering our 
findings on Labour and Conservative partisans attitudes towards the attack ads employed in 
the election.  
The attitudes of Labour and Conservative Partisans towards attack ads (H1a, H1b) 
With respect to young Conservative and Labour partisans, our findings indicate that partisans 
of the party under attack have a significantly more negative attitude towards the ad attacking 
their party than partisans from the opposing party. Consequently our young Conservative 
partisans judged the ad accusing David Cameron of hypocrisy (camera on/off image-attack) 
more harshly than did Labour partisans. Labour partisans, in turn, evaluated the ad 
emphasising Labour’s ‘job tax’ (issue-attack) more harshly than the Conservative partisans. 
Our findings thus concur with previous studies that show evidence of a partisan bias (for 
example, see Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Goren, 2002; Stevens, et al., 2008; Westen, et 
al., 2006). Accordingly voters’ party orientation prejudices their responses to election 
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messages – in this case the attack ads used in the 2010 British general election. Consequently, 
in  line with Einwiller et al (2006) our young partisans bias their processing of information, 
via ‘motivated reasoning’, in order to reach an emotionally grounded evaluation of the 
election messages within the advertising, respectively enabling them to reject claims of 
Cameron’s hypocrisy and Labour’s ‘dubious’ jobs tax employment policy. Therefore, as 
Goren (2002) observes, it appears that the cues from the advertising may well be being used 
to facilitate partisans’ sense of evaluating political offerings objectively and rationally (we 
return to this issue later in our discussion when we consider cognitive and affective attitudes 
towards the ads). Furthermore, this appraisal bias potentially enables them to reaffirm their 
sense of identity and belonging to their respective party and their partisan peers – as young 
Conservatives or young Labourites. Thus, we also see the influence of social identity via their 
in-groups/out-groups (Duck, et al., 1998; Elder, et al., 2006), as our young partisans portray 
their party identity through their acceptance of the advertising messages from their party, 
whilst rejecting those of opposing parties (regardless of their merits). Consequently it 
becomes normalised for Labour partisans to hold more positive attitudes to ads attacking the 
Conservatives and for Conservative partisans to  hold more positive attitudes to ads attacking 
Labour – as both groups aim to assert their political compliance, loyalty and identity through 
their message evaluations. 
Third party effect and non-voters’ attitudes towards issue and image-attack ads (H2a, H2b, 
H3a, H3b)
With respect to third party voters (LibDem partisans), interestingly they showed similar 
attitudes towards the ads as the partisans of the party under attack. This supports Stevens et al 
(2008) who posited that partisans and independents process the same ad differently. This 
third-party effect is considerably under-researched in political marketing, deeming our 
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findings of significant merit. Speculating on why LibDems respond in this way, may, in part, 
reflect the character of LibDem voters and the wider party positioning that has tended not to 
use attack advertising to the same degree in its election campaigning as either Labour or the 
Conservatives (a fuller account of this can be found in Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2005; 
Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2011). This may, perhaps, reflect motivated reasoning that 
serves to enhance the distinctiveness (in the minds of our young partisans) of a LibDem 
identity compared with Conservatives and Labour. Their 2010 advertising rhetoric certainly 
suggested this positioning with their Labour and Conservative ‘broken promises’ narrative 
(Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2011).  
Moving on to consider non-voters’ attitudes towards the ads, non-voters have more 
negative attitudes towards both ads than the partisan voters not under attack, and their 
attitudes align themselves with those of partisans of the party under attack in the ad (no 
significant differences were found between them, p>.000). This more negative orientation of 
our young non-voters may be a reflection of their broader negative attitudes towards electoral 
politics per se, examined earlier in this paper, for example the issues of low trust, high levels 
of political cynicism and the irrelevance of electoral politics to their everyday lives. Hence 
the attack ads serve to confirm and reinforce their negative appraisal of politicians, leaders 
and parties (Dermody, Hanmer-Lloyd, Koenig-Lewis, & Zhao, 2013). This is because the ad 
campaigns portray politicians as not acting in the electorates' 'best interests', which lies at the 
foundation of building trust. Therefore, image-attack advertising in particular does not serve 
to cognitively engage non-voters (a justification for its use), but rather to confirm and feed 
their pre-existing negative political attitudes. Consequently it accords with critics of attack 
advertising who maintain it discredits political argument and breeds cynicism and political 
alienation (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Dermody, et al., 
2013; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Schenck-Hamlin, et al., 2000; Stevens, 2009). These findings 
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are thus of specific importance in the youth engagement deliberations of policy makers as 
well as political marketers.  
Partisans’ and non-voters’ affective and cognitive evaluations of image and issue-attack 
ads (H4a, H4b) 
We now examine partisans’ and non-voters’ attitudes to issue and image-attack ads in more 
detail, by considering differences between their affective and cognitive ad evaluations. 
Overall our findings show that the affective evaluation of image-attack advertising is 
significantly more negative than cognitive evaluation. This effect does not occur for issue-
attack advertising. This might reflect the inherently emotive nature of image-attack 
advertising that serves to denigrate or destroy reputations. It also enhances our partial 
understanding of how and why attack advertising, through its affective and cognitive 
foundations, is perceived differently; and, perhaps, why one is more acceptable than the other 
(an issue we consider further below when we explore the acceptability of issue versus image-
attack advertising). Accordingly, with respect to arguments proposing advertising cues aid 
partisans to objectively and rationally evaluate political offerings (e.g. see Goren, 2002), our 
findings suggest that while the affective and cognitive  blending for issue-attack ads might 
enable this to occur (with affective responses becoming more cognitive via emotive 
appraisal),(7) this is much more unlikely for image-attack ads. We propose this is because the 
negative emotions they trigger override efforts to both emotionally and cognitively deliberate 
on the merits of the message. As Illouz (2009) observes, emotions can limit analytical 
thinking. Additionally, particularly with strong emotions such as fear, combined with risk, 
psychological defence mechanisms can be triggered that lead individuals to a state of denial 
and disempowerment as they refuse to intellectually engage with the messages. There is 
evidence for this effect in the research of Bohm (2003) and Kollmuss & Agyeman (2002). 
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The negative emotions triggered by image-attack ads might result in a more pessimistic 
viewpoint (see for example Nerb & Spada, 2001 on evaluating environmental problems). 
This scenario is problematic for youth, given their already low levels of trust and higher 
cynicism; since it adds further credence to the argument that image-attack ads fuel their 
negative political attitudes, which underlie their sense of political estrangement. Hence once 
again the cognitive justification for the use of attack advertising in election campaigning is 
challenged.  
We now move on to consider the variation between our partisans’ and non-voters’ 
appraisal of attack advertising. With respect to image-attack ads, our results demonstrate 
significant differences between the affective and cognitive negativity evaluations of all three 
partisan groups. This difference did not exist for our young non-voters, since their affective 
and cognitive evaluation strength was essentially the same. Thus, both affect and cognition 
are equally implicated in non-voters more negative appraisal of image-attack advertising. 
This again lends credence to critics of attack advertising who claim it undermines political 
argument and increases youth political cynicism (for example see Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 
1997; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Dermody, et al., 2013; Yoon, 1995). Dissecting these 
findings further, most notably it appears that the affective and cognitive evaluation of image-
attack advertising is significantly less negative for our young Labour partisans and most 
negative for our young Conservative partisans. We again see a partisan bias triggering 
motivated reasoning, with the attack against David Cameron triggering more affective and 
cognitive outrage from Conservative partisans and greater acceptance from Labour partisans 
who might have felt there was some decision-making merit in the underlying message. With 
reference to social identity theory, particularly in/out groups, we may also be seeing Labour 
partisans portraying their political allegiance bias through their responses to image-attacks 
against the Conservatives. Finally, interestingly the affective negativity of our LibDem 
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partisans is close to that of the Conservatives, which perhaps mirrors the third-party effect 
discussed above.   
While there were no significant differences between the affective and cognitive 
evaluations of our partisans and non-voters with respect to the issue-attack advertising, the 
negativity appraisals between these groups were significantly different. Our young Labour 
partisans evaluations were the most negative of all, and our young Conservatives the least 
negative. Perhaps our Conservative partisans had internalised the norms of Conservative 
campaigning, which is historically more negative (Lau & Pomper, 2001, 2004). Non-voters’ 
evaluations were also negative, but not to the same degree as our Labour partisans. It is 
highly likely that Labour partisans were reacting to their party being attacked, whereas for 
non-voters it was their broader, more impersonalised cynicism emerging.   
Acceptability of issue and image-attack advertising (H5) 
With respect to the acceptability of issue and image-attack ads, our findings confirm that 
issue-attacks are judged to be far more acceptable than image-attacks. This supports 
consensus among academics and practitioners that issue-attack advertising is generally 
considered to be more acceptable, perhaps because it has the potential to be cognitively 
engaging in line with our earlier synopsis of the attack advertising scholarship. It may well 
also be more reflective of the perceived adversarial character of elections entailing the battle 
over policies. This effect gives further ammunition to concerns surrounding the detrimental 
consequences of attack advertising, particularly those image-attack ads that attack the 
personalities of candidates. As Kates (1998, p. 1879) observes, “Consistent with prior 
research, negative advertising which attacks upon personal characteristics was judged by the 
participants as unacceptable, unethical and unfair play”. As discussed above, combining this 
with our earlier findings, the scholarship on partisanship and motivated reasoning helps us to 
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more fully understand why the Conservative partisans judged image-attack ads to be more 
unacceptable than the Labour/LibDem partisans and non-voters. Reflecting on the 
Conservative partisans’ responses to the ‘Camera on/off’ ad, perhaps this ad was still very 
much front-of-mind when they answered “…how acceptable are ads that attack 
personalities…” It was, after all, their leader's character being attacked. Furthermore, in line 
with wider opinion polling, they might have expected David Cameron to be the next Prime 
Minister and thus all personalised attacks against him were unjustified. This concurs with 
prior studies examining the mediating variable of expectations of the election outcome 
(Babad & Yacabos, 1993; Ross, et al., 1977).   
The influence of attack ads on (non) voting (H6) 
Finally we consider the influence of attack ads on voting decision-making. We recognise the 
problems associated with attributing advertising effects directly to behaviour. Thus, even 
while our findings are statistically significant, we offer them cautiously, with the call for 
further research.   
Interestingly the attack ads had a greater influence on the voting decisions of our 
young partisans whose party was not in power at the time of the election (Conservative and 
LibDem) and less influence on our young Labour partisans and non-voters. We can begin to 
tentatively explain this with reference to the 2010 electoral landscape. Given the well 
documented unpopularity of Labour and their leader Gordon Brown, Labour partisans found 
it more difficult to ‘process’ the ads and thus internalise them as part of their decision-making 
repertoire; maybe because of their defence mechanisms triggered by their negative emotions. 
Perhaps they had lost hope in their party and its ability to address the crisis facing the country 
(recession, debt, unemployment etc). The motivation to win, as challenger parties, gave a 
stronger motivation to Conservative and LibDem partisans to engage with the ads. Possibly 
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they had more hope in their respective party to address the economic challenges facing the 
UK. Certainly, in the run-up to the election, David Cameron (Conservative leader) was 
reigning high in the opinion polls and Nick Clegg (LibDem leader) had significantly 
increased the party’s popularity following the leader debates to become a serious second 
challenger party. This could potentially reflect the moderating effect of election outcome 
expectancy, discussed earlier. Thus, the young Conservative partisans expected their party to 
win, and the young LibDem partisans expected their party to gain more seats to increase their 
political voice. This may well have helped to stimulate their motivated reasoning bias.  
Overall then, with respect to young partisans, our findings suggest the election 
advertising is influencing their voting decision-making to some degree, thereby partially 
supporting American research claiming young voters regard election ads as a legitimate 
source of electoral information (Kaid, et al., 2007). This legitimacy however might be more 
applicable to issue-attack than image–attack ad campaigns. This is because our evidence 
(with other studies) indicates that attack ads that focus on policy issues (issue-attacks) are 
considered to be more acceptable election messages. Furthermore, issue-attacks are less 
likely to result in negative emotions; consequently analytical thinking is not compromised.  A 
question mark remains, however, surrounding the consequences of sustained image-attack ad 
campaigns on youth political cynicism and low trust. This leads us to consider the effects of 
the attack advertising on non-voters decision-making – their non-voting in contrast to 
partisans voting decision-making. Our findings show that the attack advertising is having a 
low influence on their decision not to vote. In many ways this is not surprising given the 
evidence on young non-voters electoral disengagement. Therefore it would appear that the 
ads for this group are of limited relevance as an engagement tool; instead serving to reinforce 
their cynicism towards the ‘damaging’ consequences of politicians and their policies. This 
might further explain their affective and cognitive negative evaluations of attack advertising 
28 | P a g e
discussed above. Thus we may well be seeing a motivated reasoning effect and an 
expectations effect for non-voters too, as their cynicism biases their message takeout from the 
ads. This needs fuller investigation.  
Conclusions 
Having presented and discussed our findings, we now consider how our study contributes to 
understanding of electoral attack ad processing. This is followed by a critical appraisal of the 
relevance of marketing, and specifically attack advertising, to electoral politics.  
The contribution of our study 
Our study makes a significant contribution in furthering our understanding of how the British 
youth electorate process election attack advertising messages both as partisans and non-
voters, and how this processing differs between these groups and, to some degree, between 
ads attacking personalities (image-attacks) and those attacking policies (issue-attacks). 
Drawing on the theory of motivated reasoning, we have been able to more fully explain how 
our young first-time voters appraise advertising messages, both cognitively and emotionally, 
as a result of their political identity and allegiances as partisans and non-voters. Overall our 
research provides further evidence that young partisans and non-voters do not passively 
receive information, but are actively involved in motivated reasoning that entails biased 
information (de)selection and critical appraisal. Thus, partisans’ party identification strongly 
influences their selection, encoding and evaluation of advertising messages in order to defend 
their social identities. Our study confirms a processing bias whereby partisans seek to 
maintain their cognitive consistency with their existing attitudes by rating the attack ads 
generated by their own party as less negative than the partisans under attack.  
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Furthermore our study adds to knowledge of how third-party partisans and non-voters 
process attack ads, where currently little research is available. The results demonstrated that 
third-party voters and non-voters responded significantly more negatively to attack 
advertising, in a similar way to the partisans under attack. Perhaps third-party voters’ and 
non-voters’ cynicism biases their ad message interpretation, but further research is needed to 
explore these effects in more depth. 
The empirical results suggest that partisanship (i.e. social identity with a political 
party) has to a certain extent an immunising effect against the impact of attack ads generated 
by their own party. In other words, whilst partisans might in general not agree with attack 
advertising, such attack ads can result in a defensive reaction entailing a processing bias in 
order to sustain their loyalty to their in-group. However, partisans’ and non-voters’ 
acceptance of image-attack ads was significantly lower than that of issue-attack ads. This 
provokes the question, at what level of negativity a tipping point is reached at which even 
partisans cannot accept negative attack ads on the basis of defending their social identities. 
Thus strengthening critics who are challenging why and whether image-attack advertising 
should be used in election campaigning, particularly under the guise of an effective tool for 
electoral involvement and mobilisation. 
Consequently our ongoing research in political advertising and youth consumption of 
electoral politics raises a plethora of questions that facilitate a much needed more critical 
appraisal of the relevance of marketing theory and practice to electoral politics. This 
evaluation is becoming increasingly important, with increasing consideration being given to 
what marketing is doing to politics and, in turn what politics is doing to the reputation of 
marketing.(8) Given the focus of our research, we narrow this question to critically consider 
the use of attack election advertising as a means of electoral engagement. 
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The relevance of marketing to political campaigning theory and practice  
We begin our critique by considering political marketing consultants, campaign strategists 
and political leaders’ belief that negative attack ad campaigns win elections. The evidence, 
including our sustained research in political advertising and youth engagement, suggests 
strongly that this winning mentality is not a universal truth. Accordingly the effects of 
negative campaigning vary by sociodemographic-psychographic segments and by message 
type ranging from the less adversarial comparative negative campaigns to the more 
antagonistic attack ad campaigns, and in particular image-attacks. Consequently politicians 
and their advisors need to consider who they are attempting to cognitively engage with which 
types of negative ads, why these ads might disengage some segments, and what the 
consequences of this might be for liberal democracy.  
Negative campaigning is not all the same; neither are its effects, nor the sense-making 
of different electoral segments. Thus a ‘blind belief’ in it signals a failure to understand 
advances in message construction and its communication and audience interactions that 
characterise contemporary marketing. Consequently the way in which election attack 
advertising is currently conceived is a misrepresentation of marketing; fundamentally it is a 
misunderstanding of the philosophy of marketing which is premised on exchange and 
positive value propositions to gain competitive advantage and market growth. 
 Building on this ‘winning mentality’, we now consider politicians’ rhetoric on 
electoral engagement and the potential paradoxes that ensue. Within the UK and other 
Western democracies, political leaders have stressed the need to rebuild public trust in 
politicians and the electoral process in order to re-engage them. However their emphasis on 
winning, which entails a plethora of attack advertising messages that instil fear and anxiety, 
weaken hope and fuel cynicism and mistrust, undermines any efforts for trust-building (and 
lends credence to voter demobilisation concerns expressed by critics of attack advertising). 
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As we have argued previously, winning and engagement are strategically different, albeit 
politicians may not always want to recognise the distinction. Consequently, unlike marketing 
per se, which is premised on growing customers/volunteers/members and the marketplace, 
electoral campaign marketing aims to shrink the voter ‘market place’. This is because it is 
premised on mobilising a parties own partisans, whilst demobilising opposing partisans and 
tactical voters so they do not vote. This is particularly problematic for a youth electorate 
predisposed to disengage from the political process. Consequently claims that trust-building 
is important are paradoxical. The evidence strongly signals marketing strategies to build trust 
are invisible in election campaigning.(9) 
 Thus, what kind of marketing is political marketing as it is currently theorised and 
practiced? Is it little more than a collection of tactics designed to fulfil the ambitions of 
politicians, with disregard for the underlying premises of marketing? If so, then we argue 
what we are witnessing is political marketing as a hybrid form of propaganda.(10) This is very 
evident within the realms of attack election advertising, and particularly image-attack ads; 
given the evidence we have presented showing its effects on the political trust and distrust of 
British youth.(10) This raises reputational consequences for both politics and marketing, and 
concern over the marriage between them. Responsibility is therefore central to the future 
credibility of political marketing, and this could begin with a serious debate on why political 
advertising in the UK remains unregulated. 
If political marketing is to advance conceptually and professionally, emphasis needs to 
be given to how it can be used positively to nourish the electorates’ engagement with 
electoral politics, particularly given electoral cynicism. In so doing it has the potential to 
contribute to the youth engagement deliberations of policy makers as well as political 
marketing scholars. Consequently as the 2015 British election draws closer, the contribution 
of marketing to political campaigning should be residing within the strategic formulation of 
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positive and evidential, information-rich marketing campaigns, pre and during the election 
period, that utilise the strategies of trust (re)building.  
Limitations and further research  
A number of limitations of the study should be noted. Firstly, responses to only two stimulus 
ads were measured in the paper – a Conservative issue-attack ad and a Labour image-attack 
ad. Thus the findings might not be generalisable across all partisan groups and non-voters. 
Further research should adopt a more symmetrical approach by randomly assigning 
respondents to issue and image attack ads from all political parties including the third-party. 
This would also avoid a potential framing effect with respondents to indicate that the parties 
only use one type of attack. Secondly, the results revealed a sample self-selection bias, i.e. a 
higher proportion of students and claimed voters participated in the survey. This makes 
generalisation to the 18-22 year-old first-time voter population more difficult.  Thirdly, we 
asked our survey respondents directly what influence the two attack ads had on their voting 
and thus assumed that they are aware of these effects. We do recognise the difficulties 
involved in isolating the direct effects of advertising. Therefore future research could adopt a 
third-person technique to capture these influences, thereby decreasing the potential response 
bias.  
Overall our research raises many important issues that provide a rich foundation for 
further research that can remain focused on youth or be expanded to include older electoral 
segments and other message platforms. For example, it would also be interesting to examine 
the effects of motivated reasoning bias on other forms of mediated and unmediated election 
communication, e.g. social media campaigns, within which the lives of many young people 
reside. This might also be pertinent as the role of advertising shifts in future election 
campaigns.  
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With respect to our youth data, its emerging complexity signals the need for fuller 
interpretative enquiry to more fully explain the ‘why’ of our findings. For example, we need 
to more fully understand what it means for young first-time voters to be partisans and non-
voters – with respect to their identity(s), message processing, political attitudes and their 
electoral behaviour in the short, medium and long term. Another fruitful area of research 
would be to more fully investigate if, like our young partisans, our young non-voters also 
employ motivated reasoning biases in their message takeout from the ads, and, if so what the 
foundations of this bias are, for example higher cynicism, low trust. Related to processing 
bias, it would also be pertinent to examine whether expectations of the election outcome acts 
as a mediating variable in explaining the evaluations and behaviour of young partisans and 
non-voters.  
We leave you with this final thought from the Economist (2013, p. 11) “Fundamental 
opinions about society are like bones: they are shaped in youth”.   
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Notes  
1. Reported turnout & non-voting for 18-24 year olds: 2001 – 39% turnout, 61% non-voting. 
2005 - 37% turnout, 63% non-voting. 2010 - 44% turnout, 56% non-voting. (2010). 
Source: Ipsos MORI statistics (2010); (Electoral Commission, 2001, 2005). While 2010 
statistics show an increase in turnout compared with 2001 and 2005, this is still 
considerably lower than turnout during the 1980s and 1990s (see note 2). 
2. Reported turnout & non-voting for 18-24 year olds: 1987 - 66% turnout, 34% non-voting 
(Swaddle & Heath, 1992). 1992 - 61% turnout, 39% non-voting (Butler and Kavanagh 
1997).  1997 - 68% turnout, 32% non-voting (Jowell & Park, 1998).  
3. A wealth of multidisciplinary studies has investigated political participation. However, as 
Tonge and Mycock (2010) observe, many of the disengagement studies conflate the 
attitudes of broad populations, not youth specifically, and thus their conclusions need to 
be treated with caution. Accordingly in our appraisal of the disengagement research 
(appendix 1), we have focused on investigations that concern youth specifically and, 
where appropriate, extracted the findings pertinent to youth in non-segmented inquiries.
4. Interviewers were instructed to select every fifth individual that they felt would fit the 
sampling criteria (British citizen, 18-22 years old). Filter questions were used to ensure 
the individual met these criteria. If they did not, they were rejected and the process began 
again. Once the interview was complete, the selection process then continued.  
5. While official records of voter turnout are not completely accurate, figures from Ipsos 
MORI (2010) report 33% of the 18-24 year olds voted for Conservatives, 34.1% for 
Labour and 33% for LibDems in 2010. Consequently, there is slight underrepresentation 
of Labour voters in our sample. However direct comparison is problematic because the 
MORI sample is broader than our 18-22 year olds, which means they included older and 
non-first time voters in their sampling. 
6. The difficulty our interviewers experienced in securing completed questionnaires took two 
forms. Firstly refusals and secondly the level of respondent encouragement needed to 
complete the questionnaire. 1000 completed questionnaires were sought and 733 were 
fully completed in the timescale.
7. Emotions have multiple dimensions, one of which is appraisal.  Emotive appraisal is the 
emotional assessment of the merit of the incoming stimulus (message). This enables the 
receiver to accept or reject the message, for example the image-attack ad, depending on 
whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for them. For a fuller account please see: (1) Arnold, M.B. 
(1970). Feelings and Emotion: The Loyola Symposium. Academic Press, New York, 
London. (2) Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford 
University Press. (3) Nyer, P. U. (1997). A study of relationships between cognitive 
appraisals and consumption emotions. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 25 
(Fall), 296-304
8. For example ‘What is Marketing doing to Politics?’ was recently the theme of the 7th
International Political Marketing conference hosted by Stockholm University Business 
School (September 2013). http://www.fek.su.se/en/IPMC/
It has also been the subject of several books, for example Savigny, H. (2008). The 
Problem of Political Marketing. London: Continumm International Publishing Group 
Ltd. 
9.  A fuller account of this can be found in Dermody, J., & Hanmer-Lloyd, S. (2005). An 
exploration of the advertising ambitions and strategies of the 2005 British General 
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Election. Journal of Marketing Management, 21, 1021-1047. Dermody, J., & Hanmer-
Lloyd, S. (2011). An introspective, retrospective, futurespective analysis of the attack 
advertising in the 2010 British General Election. Journal of Marketing Management, 
27(7/8), 736-761. Dermody, J., Hanmer-Lloyd, S., Koenig-Lewis, N., & Zhao, A. L. 
(2013). Attack Advertising as an Agent of British Youth Political Disempowerment? A 
Review of Empirical Evidence from the 2010 British General Election. In R. G. R. 
Scullion, D. Jackson & D. Lilleker (Ed.), The Media, Political Participation and 
Empowerment (pp. 39-57). Abindon Oxon: Routledge Research in Political 
Communication. 
10. This argument was advanced in a keynote address by Professor Nicholas O’Shaughnessy 
– ‘The Dark Side of Political Marketing’ at the 7th IPMC (2013). It was also raised and 
discussed by Dr Janine Dermody in her research presentation and as a member of a 
special panel on ‘What’s marketing doing to Politics?’ See note 8. 
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Appendix 1: Youth Electoral Engagement Studies
Youth Political Attitudes and Behaviour Studies 
Turnout at elections is lower for the youth 
electorate compared with older voters, and the drop 
in turnout indicates an increasing predisposition 
amongst this younger age group not to vote in 
elections.  
Abrial et al (2003); Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 
(2008); Berman (1997); Bromley and Curtice 
(2002); Curtice and Jowell (1997); EC (2003); 
Feldmann-Feldmann-Wojtachnia et al (2010); 
Franklin (2004); Gerber et al (2003); Johnston et al 
(2006); Mulgan and Wilkinson (1997); Muxel 
(2001); Niemi and Hepburn (1995); Norris (2003); 
Nye et al (1997); Park (1999); Paul 2010; Pickel 
(2002); Pintor and Gratschew (2002); Reinhardt 
and Tillmann (2002); Russell et al (2002).  
Young people are less interested in national 
political issues than older adults; and they know 
less about the election process, particularly those 
from economically and educationally 
impoverished backgrounds.  
Bromley and Curtice (2002); Park (1999); Parry 
et al (1992); Pintor and Gratschew (2002); 
Pickel (2002); Pirie and Worcester (1998, 2000); 
Reinhardt and Tillmann (2002); Russell et al 
(2002); White et al (2000).  
Young people perceive politicians and 
governments as dishonest, untrustworthy and 
inefficacious - contributing to their belief that 
voting is a ‘worthless’ act, or creating anger 
resulting in the withholding of their vote.  
Bromley and Curtice (2002); Delli Carpini (2000); 
Dermody et al (2010); Eliasoph (1998); Fieldhouse 
et al (2007); Mulgan and Wilkinson (1997); Park 
(1999); Parry et al (1992); Pickel (2002); Pintor 
and Gratschew (2002); Reinhardt and Tillmann 
(2002); White et al (2000).  
Large proportions of young people feel 
politically alienated from their society, and are 
therefore not voting.  
Dermody and Scullion (2005); Fieldhouse et al 
(2007); Halpern (2003); Huggins (2001); Mulgan 
and Wilkinson (1997); Nye et al (1997); Pintor and 
Gratschew (2002); Pirie and Worcester (1998, 
2000); Putnam (2000); White et al (2000).  
Globalisation is undermining the credibility and 
authority of national governments - destabilizing 
faith in a nation’s elected officials and 
reinforcing youth electoral apathy, or triggering 
them to politically engage through protest as 
political activists – a state of alter-globalisation.  
Beck (1997); Bromley et al (2001); Cerny (1999); 
Crozier et al. (1975); Dermody and Scullion 
(2005); Muxel (2001); Pleyers (2005, 2010); 
Touraine (1999).  
Electoral civic-mindedness is less strong in young 
people than it is in older adults, contributing to 
non-voting behaviour, or more self-centred voting 
behaviour.  
Abrial et al (2003); Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 
(2008); Bromley and Curtice (2002); Halpern 
(2003); Mulgan and Wilkinson (1997); Park 
(1999); Pirie and Worcester (1998, 2000); White et 
al (2000).  
Source: Dermody, J, Hanmer-Lloyd, S., Koenig-Lewis, N. and Zhao, A.L. (2013), Attack Advertising 
as an Agent of British Youth Political Disempowerment? A Review of Empirical Evidence from the 
2010 British General Election. In R. Scullion, R. Gerodimos, D. Jackson and D. Lilleker (Eds.), The 
Media, Political Participation and Empowerment, Routledge Research in Political Communication, p. 
41. 
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Appendix 2: Stimulus ads  
Ad1: Image-attack ad Stimulus Poster Brief Description 
Camera On/Off  
Source: Saatchi & Saatchi (used with 
permission)  
Ad was designed to show the 
inconsistencies and hypocrisy of David 
Cameron – what he said in public and what 
he thought privately. ‘Saving the NHS’ was 
a salient, hugely emotive election issue.  
Two ads attack David Cameron on two 
issues – the NHS and gay adoption. This ad 
implies the Tories would cut the ‘right to 
see a cancer specialist within two weeks’ 
(which they strongly denied).  
The ad implies a lack of integrity and vote 
chasing. It also resonates with accusations 
of ‘Dave the Chameleon’ – changing his 
promises (colours) to remain popular with 
the electorate (and win votes). This has the 
potential to trigger emotions – appraisal- 
cognitive deliberation.  
Ad2: Issue-attack ad Stimulus Poster Brief Description 
Let’s Cut, Stop, Restore  
Source: M&C Saatchi (used with 
permission)  
Launched approx 2 weeks into election 
campaign (20th April), this collection of 3 
ads aimed to refocus attention back on 
Cameron and his ‘big society’. The job tax 
ad is the only one to directly reference 
labour ‘policy’.  
Attack is more oblique, overlaid with 
positive message framing entailing very 
bold copy featuring confident messages on 
Tory policies on taxes (benefits & 
discipline). These messages would resonate 
very strongly with Tory voters.  
Suggests a ‘hearts and mind’ approach to 
retain Tory voters and capture floating 
voters, particularly those thinking of voting 
LibDem (given this debate at this election).  
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Appendix 3: Sample Profile 
Demographic Variable Category Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender 
(based on 641 valid responses) 
Male 
Female 
302 
339 
47.1 
52.9 
Age 
(based on 645 valid responses)
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
90 
124 
143 
143 
145 
13.9 
19.2 
22.2 
22.2 
22.5 
Employment status  
(based on 645 valid responses)
Full-time student 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Other 
415 
167 
42 
21 
64.2 
25.9 
6.5 
3.3 
Party voted for in 2010 
British General Election 
Conservative 
Labour 
LibDem 
Non-Voters 
164 
113 
147 
222 
25.4  
17.5  
22.8  
34.4 
Split of voters by party 
(based on 424 voters)
Conservative 
Labour 
LibDem 
164 
113 
147 
38.7 
26.7 
34.7 
